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Abstract
In exchange economies with indivisible objects, the substitutability of agents
preferences is essential for the guaranteed existence of Walrasian equilibrium. In
this paper, we analyze the ranges of variation for agentspreferences that will
guarantee the existence of equilibrium when some agentspreferences are known
to satisfy the substitutability condition. Our approach is based on a classication
result that partitions the set of economies into disjoint weak similarity classes such
that whenever a weak similarity class contains an economy with an equilibrium,
each economy in this class also has an equilibrium. The links among economies in
the same weak similarity class are established with the notion of monotonization
and tax systems.
Keywords: Equilibrium; indivisibility; substitutability; free disposal; tax sys-
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1 Introduction
Consider an exchange economy with heterogeneous indivisible objects and money. When
some agentspreferences are known, a natural question is to analyze the ranges of vari-
ation for the other agentspreferences that will guarantee the existence of Walrasian
equilibrium. To study the question, we introduce the notion of t-substitutability that
extends the substitutability condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982) by incorporating the
e¤ects of the availability of free disposal and a tax system t.
The free disposal condition is commonly imposed in economic models to ensure the
monotonicity of agentspreferences. The intuition behind this argument is that once an
agent is allowed to discard unwanted objects for free, possessing more objects will not
actually hurt the agents satisfaction. To address the inuence of the availability of free
disposal, we formulate the notion of monotonization of an agents utility function that
looks at the highest utility which can be achieved by dropping dislikes out of a given
collection of objects. Then we use this notion, together with tax systems, to partition
the set of economies into disjoint weak similarity classes and shows that whenever a
weak similarity class contains an economy with an equilibrium, each economy in this
class also has an equilibrium. This classication result will be essential in our analysis.
A tax system is represented by a tax vector t = (ta), i.e., a real-valued function
over the set of objects. When such a system is employed, the amount of money paid
for an object a will become the sum of its market price and ta. Hence, the agent is
after-tax utility of consuming the object a is equal to is original (before-tax) utility of
consuming the combination of object a and  ta units of money.
An agent is utility function is called t-monotone if is after-tax utility function
with respect to the tax vector t is monotone. An agents utility function satises the
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t-substitutability condition if objects are substitutes for the agent whenever free dis-
posal of objects becomes available and the tax system t is employed. The notions of
t-monotonicity and t-substitutability have transparent economic interpretations and are
easily conrmed.1 We prove that when an agents utility function satises the substi-
tutability condition and is t-monotone, the set consisting of all t-substitutability utility
functions is a range for the other agentsutility functions for which the existence of
equilibrium is guaranteed. This observation extends the existence result induced from
the analysis of Kelso and Crawford (1982). In their seminal article, Kelso and Crawford
study a job-matching market and prove that the core of their market, which coincides
with the set of Walrasian equilibria, is non-empty if each rms production technology
satises the substitutability condition. Since the t-substitutability condition is weaker
than the substitutability condition, our analysis generalizes Kelso and Crawfords exis-
tence result for economies with indivisible objects.
Furthermore, we show that as more agents reveal their preferences, the range for
the other agents preferences that can guarantee the existence of equilibrium might
be further enlarged. In many practical economic situations, it is di¢ cult to know
precisely all the agentspreferences. Our analysis will then be useful when the range of
agentspreferences is roughly known and a number of agents are willing to reveal their
preferences truthfully. To better illustrate the point, consider a sequence of tax vectors
t1; : : : ; tl and an economy in which each agents utility function is known to satisfy the
ti-substitutability condition for at least some i 2 f1; : : : ; lg. If we can further verify
that for each i 2 f1; : : : ; lg, there exists an agent whose utility function satises the
substitutability condition and is ti-monotone, then our analysis can ensure the existence
1Reijnierse, Gellekom and Potters (2002) provide an easy way to verify substitutability for utility
functions. In sight of their method, it is not di¢ cult to verify whether a utility function satises the
t-substitutability condition.
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of equilibrium while the other agentsprecise preferences are left unknown.
The substitutability for indivisible objects has received increasing attention in re-
cent years. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) prove that both their single improvement (SI)
condition and no complementarities (NC) condition are equivalent to the substitutabil-
ity condition. Fujishige and Yang (2003) draw the equivalence between M \-concavity
and substitutability in the framework of discrete convex analysis. Various extensions
of substitutability from Kelso and Crawfords job-matching market to matching mod-
els with multiple contract terms are respectively introduced by Hateld and Milgrom
(2005) and Hateld and Kojima (2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section
2. In Section 3, we study the inuence of the monotonization on the existence of
Walrasian equilibrium and prove a structural result that classies economies with the
weak similarity relation. In Section 4, we generalize Kelso and Crawfords existence
result with the notion of t-substitutability. Section 5 relates our analysis to a non-
existence result by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and a existence result by Sun and Yang
(2006). Section 6 concludes and three proofs are presented in the Appendices.
2 The model
Consider an exchange economy with a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents and a nite
set 
 = fa1; : : : ; amg of heterogeneous indivisible goods, and a perfectly divisible good
called money. Each agent i 2 N has a quasi-linear utility function ui : 2
  R ! R,
which is characterized by a valuation function vi : 2
 ! R such that the utility of agent
i holding the bundle A 2 2
 and c units of money is ui (A; c) := vi (A) + c. Each agent
i 2 N is initially endowed with a bundle 
i of goods and a su¢ cient amount of money
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ci such that 
 = [i2N
i and ci  vi (A) for all A 2 2
. Under these assumptions,
the initial endowment will be irrelevant to the e¢ cient allocations and their supporting
prices. Thus, we choose to leave the initial endowments of goods unspecied and simply
represent this exchange economy by E =
 

; (ui)i2N

.
A price vector p = (pa)a2
 2 R
 assigns a price for each good a in 
. For each
bundle A 2 2
, we use p (A) to denote the sum of prices of those goods in A, i.e.,
p (A) :=
P
a2A pa; and for each a 2 
, let ea 2 R
 denote the characteristic vector
whose i-th coordinate is 1 if ai = a and 0 otherwise.
The demand correspondence Dui : R
 ! 2
 of an agent with the utility function ui
is dened by
Dui (p) =

A 2 2
 : ui (A; p (A))  ui (B; p (B)) for all B 2 2

	
:
That is, Dui (p) is the set of bundles that maximize is utility at price level p.
An allocation for the economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

is a partition of objects among all
agents in N , that is, a set X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) of mutually exclusive bundles that exhaust

, where Xi represents the set of objects consumed by agent i under the allocation X.
The possibility that Xi = ; for some i is allowed.
A Walrasian equilibrium for the economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

is a pair hX; pi, where
X =(X1; : : : ; Xn) is an allocation for E and p 2 R
 is a price vector such that for each
agent i 2 N , ui (Xi; p (Xi))  ui (A; p (A)) for all A 2 2
, i.e., Xi 2 Dui (p). In this
case, X is called an equilibrium allocation and p an equilibrium price vector.
A valuation function vi : 2
 ! R is said to be monotone if for all B  A  
,
vi (B)  vi (A). The monotonization of a valuation function vi is the valuation functionbvi : 2
 ! R given by bvi (A) = maxBA vi (B) for all bundles A 2 2
. Note that
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vi is monotone if and only if vi = bvi. When a valuation vi is monotone, the utility
function ui characterized by vi is called a monotone utility function. Similarly, we
dene the monotonization bui of a utility function ui by bui (A; c) = bvi (A) + c for all
(A; c) 2 2
  R. Moreover, we dene the monotonization bE of E =  
; (ui)i2N to be
the economy obtained from E by replacing the utility function ui by bui for all agents
i 2 N , i.e., bE :=  
; (bui)i2N.
The monotone condition on agentsutility functions is commonly employed in eco-
nomic analyses.2 An interpretation for this setting is the introduction of the notion
of free disposal into the models. The intuition behind it is that once discarding un-
wanted objects turns to be costless, possessing more objects will not actually hurts an
agents satisfaction. Therefore, an agents original utility function will be replaced by
its monotonization when free disposal of unwanted objects becomes available to the
agent. In the next section, we will study the inuence of the availability of free disposal
on the existence of equilibrium in terms of the notion of monotonization.
Another important factor in our analysis is the tax system characterized by a vector
t = (ta)a2
 2 R
. When a tax system t is adopted, we dene agent is after-tax utility
function, ui [t] : 2
  R! R, by
ui [t] (A; c) = ui (A; c  t (A)) for (A; c) 2 2
  R, (1)
and let E [t] :=
 

; (ui [t])i2N

denote the after-tax economy. Note that hX; pi is a
Walrasian equilibrium for E if and only if hX; p  ti is a Walrasian equilibrium for
E [t].
A utility function ui is said to be t-monotone if the after-tax utility function ui [t]
2See, for example, Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Ma (1998), Gul and Stacchetti (1999), Ausubel
and Milgrom (2002), and Fujishige and Yang (2003) among others.
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is monotone. Let tui = (tuia )a2
 2 R
 denote the vector given by
tuia = min fvi (A [ fag)  vi (A) : A  
n fagg for a 2 
. (2)
Then ui is t-monotone if and only if t  tui.
3 A classication result
In this section, we will introduce the notion of weak similarity, which is an equivalence
relation on the set of economies, and prove that for any two economies E and ~E in
the same weak similarity class, E has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if ~E has a
Walrasian equilibrium.
To establish links between economies in the same weak similarity class, we are
interested in the question under which conditions the existence of equilibrium would be
immune to the inuence of the availability of free disposal.
Clearly, changes in the availability of free disposal could change agentsutility func-
tions and, hence, possibly, the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. As an illustration,
we consider the following two examples.
Example 1 Consider the economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

given by 
 = fa; b; c; dg, N =
f1; 2; 3g, and
v1 (A) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
9; if A = fa; bg ,
8; if A = fa; b; cg ,
 6; if A = fcg ,
0; otherwise,
v2 (A) = v3 (A) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
9; if A = fa; dg or fb; dg ,
4; if A = fdg ,
 6; if c 2 A,
0; otherwise.
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Note that E has a Walrasian equilibrium h(fa; b; cg ; fdg ; ;) ; (6; 6; 5; 4)i, while no Wal-
rasian equilibrium exists in bE.
The above example demonstrates that the existing equilibrium may be destroyed
by the availability of free disposal. By contrast, the following example shows that
sometimes making free disposal available to agents can help to generate an equilibrium.
Example 2 Consider the economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N1

given by 
 = fa; b; cg, N =
f1; 2g ; and
v1 (A) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
6; if A = fa; b; cg ,
5; if A = fag ,
1; if A = fcg ,
0; otherwise,
v2 (A) =
8>>>><>>>>:
7; if A = fa; bg ,
5; if A = fag or fbg ,
0; otherwise.
It is not di¢ cult to check that the economy has no Walrasian equilibrium, while it
monotonization bE has a Walrasian equilibrium h(fag ; fb; cg) ; (4; 4; 0)i.
Examples 1 and 2 show that the existence of Walrasian equilibrium could be signif-
icantly inuenced by the availability of free disposal. A feature shared by Examples 1
and 2 is that there are no agents with monotone preferences. This observation leads
to the result of the following theorem, which shows that when there exists an agent
whose utility function is monotone, the existence of equilibrium will be irrelevant to the
availability of free disposal.
Theorem 3 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy with an agent j 2 N whose utility
function uj is monotone.
(a) Each equilibrium allocation for E is an equilibrium allocation for bE.
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(b) Each equilibrium price vector for bE is an equilibrium price vector for E.
(c) E has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if bE has a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the following theorem, we try to characterize the inuence of the availability
of free disposal on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium by showing that allowing
every agent to enjoy free disposal has the same e¤ect for generating an equilibrium (or
eliminating the existing equilibria) as making free disposal available to an arbitrary
agent or as adding a ctitious agent 0 who values only money into the economy.
Theorem 4 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy. Let E 0 = (
; bu1; u2;    ; un). Let
N0 = N [ f0g and E =
 

; (ui)i2N0

the economy constructed from E by introducing a
ctitious agent, 0, whose utility function is given by u0 (A; c) = c for (A; c) 2 2
  R.
Then
(a) bE has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if E 0 has a Walrasian equilibrium; and
(b) bE has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Let E denote the set consisting of all economies with an agent having monotone
preferences. Two economies E and ~E are said to be similar, denoted by E  ~E, if there
exist vectors t; ~t 2 R
 such that E [t] 2 E , ~E ~t 2 E , and dE [t] = [~E ~t. Moreover, two
economies E and ~E are said to be weakly similar if there exists a sequence fEkgrk=0
of economies such that E = E0; ~E = Er; and Ek 1  Ek for k = 1; : : : ; r. The
following result shows that whenever a weak similarity class contains an economy with
an equilibrium, each economy in this class also has an equilibrium.
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Theorem 5 Let E be an economy that is weakly similar to another economy ~E. Then
E has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if ~E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.
4 The t-substitutability condition
The substitutability condition is a su¢ cient condition on agentspreferences to guar-
antee the existence of Walrasian equilibrium (Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Theorem 2).
A utility function ui satises the substitutability condition if for any two price vectors
p; q 2 R
 with p  q, and any bundle A 2 Dui (p), there exists B 2 Dui (q) such that
fa 2 
 : qa = pag  B. Thus, the substitutability condition ensures that the demand
for an object does not decrease when prices of some other objects increase. We denote
by   the set of utility functions satisfying the substitutability condition.
Consider an economy in which some agentspreferences are known to satisfy the
substitutability condition. We are interested in analyzing the ranges of variation for
the other agentspreferences that will guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
To study the issue, we introduce the notion of t-substitutability which incorporates
the e¤ects of monotonization and the tax system t 2 R
. A utility function ui satis-
es the t-substitutability condition if the monotonization dui [t] of the after-tax utility
function ui [t] satises the substitutability condition. Let   (t) denote the set of utility
functions satisfying the t-substitutability condition.
Proposition 6 Let ui : 2
  R ! R be a utility function and let 0 denote the zero
vector in R
.
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(a) There exists a vector t 2 R
 such that ui satises the t-substitutability condition,
i.e., ui 2
S
t2R

  (t).
(b) ui satises the substitutability condition if and only if ui satises the t-substitutability
condition for each t 2 R
, i.e.,   = T
t2R

  (t).
(c) dui [t] = dbui [t] for each t 2 R
+.
(d) If ui satises the substitutability condition, then bui satises the substitutability con-
dition. Moreover, for any t 2 R
+, if ui satises the t-substitutability condition,
then bui satises the t-substitutability condition.
(e) If ui satises the t0-substitutability condition for some t0 2 R
 and t  t0, then
ui satises the t-substitutability condition, i.e.,   (t)    (t0) for any two vectors
t; t0 2 R
 with t  t0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 6 (a) and (b) respectively implies that the notion of t-substitutability
is general enough to encompass all utility functions and is restrictive enough to char-
acterize the substitutability condition. The result of Proposition 6 (d) shows that the
substitutability (t-substitutability) of a utility function is immune to the inuence of
monotonization. This observation implies that when the existence of equilibrium is
guaranteed by the substitutability condition, it cannot be destroyed by the availability
of free disposal.
The following theorem generalizes Kelso and Crawfords existence result with the
notion of t-substitutability.
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Theorem 7 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy such that u1 satises the substitutabil-
ity condition and is t-monotone for some t 2 R
. If ui satises the t-substitutability
condition for each i 6= 1, then E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that ui satises the t-substitutability condition for each i 6= 1. In other
words, dui [t] satises the substitutability condition for each i 6= 1. Consider the after-
tax economy E [t] =
 

; (ui [t])i2N

and its monotonization dE [t] = 
;dui [t]
i2N

.
Since the utility function of each agent in dE [t] satises the substitutability condition,
it follows that dE [t] has an equilibrium. Together with the fact that u1 [t] is monotone,
we obtain that E [t] has an equilibrium, and so does E.
When we try to analyze an economy in which agent 1s utility function is known
to satisfy the substitutability condition. Based on our information about the vector
tu1 , the result of Theorem 7 can give ranges for the other agentsutility functions that
can ensure the existence of equilibrium.3 In case we know that tu1 2 T for some set of
vectors T  R
, there exists an equilibrium if ui 2
T
t2T
  (t) for each i 6= 1. In case tu1
is known precisely, then the range given by Theorem 7 can be enlarged up to   (tu1).
Conversely, in case we have no idea about whether u1 is t-monotone for any t 2 R
,
the region given by Theorem 7 to ensure the existence of equilibrium will then reduce
to   =
T
t2R

  (t).
In the next result, we analyze an economy in which a number of agentspreferences
are given and satisfy the substitutability condition.
Theorem 8 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy and let ~N be a subset of N such that
3Note that u1 is t-monotone if and only if t  tu1 .
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ui satises the substitutability condition for each i 2 ~N . If
uj 2
[
i2 ~N
  (tui) for all j 2 Nn ~N; (3)
then E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that condition (3) holds. Let N0 denote the set of agents whose utility
functions satisfy the substitutability condition. In case N0 = N , the proof is done
by Kelso and Crawfords existence result. If N0 6= N , we may choose j1 2 NnN0.
By (3), there exists i1 2 ~N such that uj1 satises the tui1 -substitutability condition.
This implies that \uj1 [tui1 ] satises the substitutability condition. Let E0 = E and let
E1 be the economy constructed from E0 by replacing agent j1s utility function with
\uj1 [tui1 ] [ tui1 ]. Note that E0 [tui1 ] 2 E , E2 [tui1 ] 2 E , and \E0 [tui1 ] = \E1 [tui1 ]. Then
we have E0  E1. Let N1 = N0 [ fj1g. In case N1 = N , the proof is done by the
combination of Theorem 5 and Kelso and Crawfords existence result. If N1 6= N ,
we can choose j2 2 NnN1 and construct the economy E2 from E1 by replacing agent
j2s utility function with \uj2 [tui2 ] [ tui2 ] for some i2 2 ~N such that \uj2 [tui2 ] [ tui2 ]
satises the substitutability condition. It is easy to verify that E1 is similar to E2. Let
N2 = N1 [ fj2g. Again, the proof is done if N2 = N .
Since N is nite, we can inductively construct a sequence fEkgrk=0 of economies such
that Ek 1  Ek for k = 1; : : : ; r, and the utility function of each agent in Er satises
the substitutability condition. Combining with Theorem 5 and Kelso and Crawfords
existence result, we obtain the desired result.
Our existence results improves on Kelso and Crawfords existence result in two re-
spects. First, our results can be applied to analyze economies in which the agentsutility
functions might violate the substitutability condition. Second, in many economic situa-
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tions, it is often di¢ cult to verify that all agentspreferences satisfy the substitutability.
Our analysis will then be useful when the range of agentspreferences is roughly known
and a number of agents are willing to reveal their preferences truthfully. Moreover, as
more agents reveal their preferences, the range for the other agentspreferences given
by Theorem 8 to ensure the existence of equilibrium can be further enlarged.
5 Applications
5.1 Gul and Stacchettis non-existence result
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) prove that there is no any weakening of the substitutability
condition that can ensure the existence of equilibrium. This result can be considered
as a converse to Kelso and Crawfords existence result and is recalled as follows.
Theorem 9 (See Gul and Stacchetti, 1999, Theorem 2) 4If agent 1s utility func-
tion u1 violates the substitutability condition, then there exists an economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

such that ui satises the substitutability condition for i = 2; : : : ; n, but E =
 

; (ui)i2N

has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Consider an economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

in which the existence of Walrasian equilib-
rium is guaranteed by the substitutability condition. Gul and Stacchettis Theorem 2
indicates that the existence of equilibrium seems vulnerable in the sense that changes
in a single agent 1s utility function might violate its substitutability and then destroy
the existence of equilibrium. An immediate application of Theorem 8 gives some new
4Gul and Stacchetti (1999) originally prove their Theorem 2 under the assumption that each utility
function is monotone. However, it is not di¢ cult to see that the non-existence result still holds when
the monotonicity assumption is removed.
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insights into the sensitivity of the existence of equilibrium to changes in agent 1s prefer-
ences. Namely, for any economy eE = (
; eu1; u2; : : : ; un) obtained from replacing agent
1s utility function by eu1, there exists an equilibrium if eu1 2 nS
i=2
  (tui).
Another interpretation for Gul and Stacchettis Theorem 2 is that the set   of utility
functions satisfying the substitutability condition is a largest set for which the existence
of equilibrium is guaranteed. The following corollary gives an analogous result for the
set   (0) of utility functions satisfying the 0-monotonicity condition.
Corollary 10 For economies with an agent having monotone preference, the set   (0)
is a largest set for which the existence of Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed. In other
words, we have
(a) for any economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N
 2 E, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium if each
agent is utility function ui satises the 0-substitutability condition; and
(b) for any utility function u1 violating the 0-substitutability condition, there exists
an economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N
 2 E such that ui satises the 0-substitutability
condition for i = 2; : : : ; n, but E =
 

; (ui)i2N

has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. (a) Assume that E 2 E and ui satises the 0-substitutability condition for
each i 2 N . Then there exists j 2 N such that uj is 0-monotone and satises the
substitutability condition. By Theorem 7, E has an equilibrium.
(b) Let u1 be a utility function that violates the 0-substitutability condition. This
implies that bu1 = [u1 [0] violates the substitutability condition. By Gul and Stacchettis
Theorem 2, there exists an economy E 0 = (
; bu1; u2; : : : ; un) 2 E such that ui satises
the substitutability condition for i = 2; : : : ; n, but E 0 =
 

; (ui)i2N

has no Walrasian
equilibrium. Let E = (
; u1; bu2; : : : ;cun) 2 E . Since E is similar to E 0, it follows that
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E has no Walrasian equilibrium by Theorem 5, but for i = 2; : : : ; n, bui 2      (0) by
Proposition 6 (b) and (d).
5.2 The gross substitutability and complementarity
It should be noted that the classication approach given in Section 4 can be used to
extend any general structure on preferences that is su¢ cient for the existence of equilib-
rium. To clarify the point, we will recall the gross substitutability and complementarity
condition introduced by Sun and Yang (2006).
Sun and Yang study an economy E =
 

; (ui)i2N

in which the set 
 of objects
can be divided into two disjoint groups S1 and S2, and show that if objects in the same
group are substitutes and objects across these two groups are complements, then the
economy E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
A utility function ui satises the gross substitutability and complementarity (GSC)
condition if for any price vector p 2 R
, a 2 Sj;   0, and A 2 Dui (p), there exists
B 2 Dui (p+ ea) such that [A \ Sj] n fag  B  (A [ Sj). When S1 = ; or S2 = ;,
the GSC condition reduces to the substitutability condition. However, it should be
noted that when ; 6= S1 6= 
, the GSC condition is logically independent from the
substitutability condition.
Let t 2 R
 be a tax vector. A utility function ui satises the t-GSC condition
if dui [t] satises the GSC condition. Let   (t) denote the set of utility functions that
satisfy the t-GSC condition. Theorem 3.1 of Sun and Yang (2006, p. 1388) shows that
if each agents utility function satises the GSC condition, then there exists a Walrasian
equilibrium. This existence result, together with the notion of t-GSC condition and a
proof similar to that of Theorem 8, naturally leads to the following theorem.
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Theorem 11 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy and let ~N be a subset of N such
that ui satises the GSC condition and is ti-monotone for each i 2 ~N . If uj 2
S
i2 ~N
  (ti)
for each j 2 Nn ~N , then E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on economies with indivisible objects. We
introduce the notion of t-substitutability to generalize the substitutability condition and
characterize ranges of variation for agentspreferences that will guarantee the existence
of Walrasian equilibrium when some agents preferences are known and satisfy the
substitutability condition. Since it is often di¢ cult to obtain each agents preferences
precisely in practical economic situations, our results will then be useful when the
range of agentspreferences is roughly known and a number of agentspreferences can
be veried to satisfy the substitutability condition.
Our main results rely on a classication theorem that partitions the set of economies
into weak similarity classes such that whenever a weak similarity class contains an econ-
omy with an equilibrium, each economy in this class also has an equilibrium. Finding
similar classication results for other economic models may signicantly extend the
scope of existing results as demonstrated in this paper.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 12 Let E =
 

; (ui)i2N

be an economy and let j 2 N be an agent whose
utility function uj is monotone. Let hX; pi be a Walrasian equilibrium for E, and let
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p0 2 R
+ be the price vector given by
p
0
a =
8><>: pa; if pa  0;0; if pa < 0: (4)
Then
(a) fa 2 
 : pa < 0g  Xj; and
(b) hX; p0i is a Walrasian equilibrium for E
Proof. (a) Suppose that there exists a 2 
nXj such that pa < 0. Since uj is monotone,
we have
vj (Xj [ fag)  p (Xj [ fag)  vj (Xj)  p (Xj)  pa > vj (Xj)  p (Xj) ;
violating the fact that hX; pi is a Walrasian equilibrium for E.
(b) Let A = fa 2 
 : pa < 0g. In case A = ;, then p0 = p and we have done. In
case A 6= ;, we have A  Xj by the result of (a). Together with the facts p0  p and
Xi 2 Dui (p), we have that for each agent i 2 N with i 6= j and for each bundle A 2 2
,
vi (Xi)  p0 (Xi) = vi (Xi)  p (Xi)  vi (A)  p (A)  vi (A)  p0 (A) :
Moreover, since Xj 2 Duj (p) and uj is monotone, it follows that for any bundle A 2 2
,
vj (Xj)  p0 (Xj) = vj (Xj)  p (Xj) + p
 
A
  vj  A [ A  p  A [ A+ p   A
= vj
 
A [ A  p0  A [ A  vj (A)  p0  A [ A
= vj (A)  p0 (A) :
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This completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
(a) Assume that hX; pi is a Walrasian equilibrium for E. Let p0 be the price vector
given by (4), by Lemma 12 (b), we obtain that hX; p0i is a Walrasian equilibrium for
E. In what follows, we are going to show that hX; p0i is also a Walrasian equilibrium
for E^.
We rst verify that
v^i (Xi) = vi (Xi) 8i 2 N: (5)
Since uj is monotone, we have v^j (Xj) = vj (Xj). Suppose that there exists some agent
i 2 Nn fjg such that v^i (Xi) > vi (Xi). Then there exists a proper subbundle B of Xi
such that v^i (Xi) = vi (B) = v^i (B). By Lemma 12 (a), we have p (Xi)  p (B). This
implies vi (B) p (B) > vi (Xi) p (B)  vi (Xi) p (Xi), violating the factXi 2 Dui (p).
We suppose on the contrary that hX; p0i is not a Walrasian equilibrium for E^. Then
there exists an agent i 2 Nn fjg such that v^i (Xi)   p0 (Xi) < v^i (C)   p0 (C) for some
bundle C 2 2
. Since hX; p0i is a Walrasian equilibrium for E, together with (5), we
have
vi (C)  p0 (C)  vi (Xi)  p0 (Xi) = v^i (Xi)  p0 (Xi) < v^i (C)  p0 (C) ; (6)
and hence vi (C) < v^i (C). This implies that there exists a proper subbundle C 0 of C
such that v^i (C) = vi (C 0). Combining with (6), we have
vi (Xi)  p0 (Xi) < v^i (C)  p0 (C) = vi (C 0)  p0 (C)  vi (C 0)  p0 (C 0) ;
violating the fact Xi 2 Dui (p0).
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(b) Assume that hX; pi is a Walrasian equilibrium for E^. Since each agent in E^ has
a monotone utility function, the result of Lemma 12 (a) implies p  0. We are going
to show that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium hY; pi for E such that Yi  Xi and
v^i (Xi) = vi (Yi) = v^i (Yi) for each agent i 2 Nn fjg, and Yj =
 [i2Nnfjg (XinYi) [Xj.
Let i be an agent with i 6= j. We consider two cases.
Case I. vi (Xi) = v^i (Xi). Let Yi = Xi. Then for any bundle A 2 2
,
vi (Yi)  p (Yi) = v^i (Xi)  p (Xi)  v^i (A)  p (A)  vi (A)  p (A) : (7)
Case II. vi (Xi) < v^i (Xi). Then there exists a proper subbundle Yi of Xi such that
v^i (Xi) = vi (Yi) = v^i (Yi). Together with the fact Xi 2 Du^i (p), we have
v^i (Xi)  p (Xi)  v^i (Yi)  p (Yi) = v^i (Xi)  p (Yi) ;
and hence pa = 0 for all a 2 XinYi. It follows that (7) holds for any bundle A 2 2
.
Let Yj =
 [i2Nnfjg (XinYi)[Xj. Since uj is monotone and pa = 0 for all a 2 YjnXj,
it follows that for any bundle A 2 2
,
vj (Yj)  p (Yj)  vj (Xj)  p (Xj) = v^j (Xj)  p (Xj)
 v^j (A)  p (A) = vj (A)  p (A) ;
and the proof of (b) is done.
Finally, the result of (c) is an immediate consequence of the combination of (a) and
(b). This completes the proof.
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Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
(a) Since E 0 2 E and E^ 0 = E^, in sight of Theorem 3, it follows that E^ has a Walrasian
equilibrium if and only if E 0 has a Walrasian equilibrium.
(b) By the result of (a), it su¢ ces to show that E 0 has a Walrasian equilibrium if
and only if E has a Walrasian equilibrium.
(() Let hX; pi be a Walrasian equilibrium for E and let p0 be the price vector given
by (4). Since X0 2 Du0 (p), we have pa  0 for all a 2 X0. By Lemma 12 and the proof
of Theorem 3 (a), it follows that
p0a =
8><>: pa  0; if a 2 
nX0,0; if a 2 X0;
and hX; p0i is a Walrasian equilibrium for E. In what follows, we are going to show X0[
X1 2 Du^1 (p0), which implies that h(X0 [X1; X2;    ; Xn) ; p0i is aWalrasian equilibrium
for E 0. For each bundle A 2 2
, there exists a subbundle A0 of A such that v^1 (A) =
v1 (A
0) and hence
v^1 (X0 [X1)  p0 (X0 [X1)  v^1 (X1)  p0 (X1)  v1 (X1)  p0 (X1)
 v1 (A0)  p0 (A0)  v^1 (A)  p0 (A) :
()) Let hX; pi be a Walrasian equilibrium for E 0. In sight of Lemma 12, we may
assume that p  0 without loss of generality. Since X1 2 Du^1 (p), there exists Y1  X1
such that v^1 (X1) = v1 (Y1) = v^1 (Y1) and pa = 0 for all a 2 X1nY1. This implies that
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for any bundle A 2 2
;
v1 (Y1)  p (Y1) = v^1 (X1)  p (X1)  v^1 (A)  p (A)  v1 (A)  p (A) ;
i.e., Y1 2 Du1 (p). Let Y0 = X1nY1 and Yi = Xi for i = 2; : : : ; n. Then hY; pi is a
Walrasian equilibrium for E.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. (a) Clearly, there exists t 2 R
+ such that ui [t] (A; 0)  0 for each A 2 2
.
Then dui [t] (A; c) = c for each pair (A; c) 2 2
  R. This implies that dui [t] satises the
substitutability condition.
(c) Let t 2 R
+ and let (A; c) 2 2
  R. It su¢ ces to prove maxCA ui [t] (C; c) =
maxBA bui [t] (B; c). LetC 2 argmaxCA ui [t] (C; c) and letB 2 argmaxBA bui [t] (B; c).
Then there exists a subbundle B0 of B such that bvi (B) = vi (B0) = bvi (B0), and hence
bui [t] (B; c) = bui (B; c)  t (B) = bvi (B) + c  t (B)  vi (B0) + c  t (B0)
= ui [t] (B
0; c)  ui [t] (C; c) = ui (C; c)  t (C)  bui (C; c)  t (C)
= bui [t] (C; c)  bui [t] (B; c) :
(d) Suppose that ui satises the substitutability condition, but bui violates the sub-
stitutability condition. By Gul and Stacchettis Theorem 2, there exists an economy
E 0 = (
;u1; : : : ; bui; : : : ; un) such that uj satises the substitutability condition for
j 2 Nn fig, but E 0 has no Walrasian equilibrium. This implies that the economy
E = (
;u0; u1; : : : ; un), where u0 is dened by u0 (A; c) = c for (A; c) 2 2
  R, has no
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equilibrium by Theorem 4, contradicting the the fact that each agents utility function
in E satises the substitutability condition.
In case ui satises the t-substitutability condition for some t 2 R
+, then dbui [t]
satises the substitutability condition. Together with the result of (c), we obtain that
bui satises the t-substitutability condition.
(e) Let t; t0 2 R
+ such that t  t0. Assume that ui satises the t0-substitutability
condition. Let u0i = ui [t
0]. Then bu0i satises the substitutability condition and ui [t] =
u0i [t  t0]. Since t   t0  0, we have dui [t] = \u0i [t  t0] = \bu0i [t  t0] by (c). This implies
that ui satises the t-substitutability condition.
(b) ()) Assume that ui satises the substitutability condition. Let t 2 R
. Then
ui [t] satises the substitutability, and so does dui [t] by (d). (() Assume that dui [t]
satises the substitutability condition for each t 2 R
. Since ui [tui ] is monotone,
ui [t
ui ] = \ui [tui ] satises the substitutability condition and so does ui.
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